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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, 
A Partnership, 
Plaintiff and Respondent: 
v. 
GLAD RAGS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Civil No. 20514 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether T e n a n t ' s d e p a r t u r e from the premises, in 
l i g h t of t h e communication between Tenant and Landlord both 
p r i o r t o and subsequent to ac tua l depar ture , cons t i tues an 
abandonment under Utah Code Ann. Sec t ion 78-36-12.3 and 
78-36-12.6. 
2 . Whether Landlord i s e n t i t l e d to recovery under the 
l e a s e or common law where the reserved r en t a l i s exceeded by 
t h e f a i r market value of the premises and the rent received 
from the new l e s s e e , and whether Landlord can be placed in a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t h a n i t would have been in had Tenant 
remained on the premises. 
3 . Whether Tenant ' s surrender of the demised premises 
and L a n d l o r d ' s taking possession, conducting Mall meetings, 
and s t o r i n g o t h e r merchant 's goods on the demised premises 
t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of the Tenant, cons t i tu ted a surrender and 
an a c c e p t a n c e of s u r r e n d e r and a termination of the lease 
agreement as a matter of law. 
4. Whether L a n d l o r d ' s attempts to r e l e t the premises 
by q u o t i n g p e r s p e c t i v e l e s sees the r a t e of $15 to $20 per 
s q u a r e f o o t and a $20,000.00 lump sum payment, when Tenant 
p a i d $8 .50 pe r s q u a r e f o o t , c o n s t i t u t e d a f a i l u r e t o 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y mi t iga te damages and bars any recovery to the 
Landlord. 
5 . Whether t h e c o u r t ' s award of one h a l f of t h e 
damages p r a y e d for by L a n d l o r d was subs t an t i a t ed by the 
r e c o r d , or w h e t h e r t h e cour t awarded said damages without 
subs t an t i a l evidence. 
6 . W h e t h e r L a n d l o r d , who a g r e e d t o a l l o w i t e m s 
b e l o n g i n g t o Tenan t to be stored and remain in the demised 
p r e m i s e s , acted as ba i l ee of those i tems, and whether Tenant 
i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r damages where Landlord fa i l ed to 
- 2 -
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r e t u r n t h e p r o p e r t y t o Tenant and where Landlord has lo s t 
control and possession of said i tems. 
7. Whether the t r i a l court committed r eve r s ib le e r ror 
by f a i l i n g t o make Findings and Conclusions on the mater ia l 
issue of the secur i ty depos i t . 
8 . W h e t h e r Glad Rags i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e s u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t . 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
78-36-12.3 Definit ions. 
(3) "Abandonment" i s presumed in e i t he r of 
the following s i t u a t i o n s : 
(a ) The t e n a n t has not no t i f i ed the owner 
t h a t he or she w i l l be, absent from the premises, 
and t h e t e n a n t f a i l s t o pay rent within 15 days 
a f t e r t h e due d a t e , and t h e r e i s no reasonable 
e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n the presence of the t e n a n t ' s 
p e r s o n a l property tha t the tenant i s occupying the 
premises; or 
(b) The t e n a n t has not no t i f i ed the owner 
t h a t he or she w i l l be absent from the premises, 
and t h e t e n a n t f a i l s to pay rent when due and the 
t e n a n t ' s p e r s o n a l property has been removed from 
t h e d w e l l i n g u n i t and t h e r e i s no r e a s o n a b l e 
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e t e n a n t i s o c c u p y i n g t h e 
premises. 
7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 . Abandoned premises - retaking 
and r e r e n t i n g by owner - l i a b i l i t y of tenant -
p e r s o n a l property of tenant l e f t on premises. In 
the event of abandonment the owner may: 
(1) R e t a k e t h e premises and attempt to rent 
them a t f a i r r e n t a l v a l u e and t h e t e n a n t who 
abandoned the premises sha l l be l i a b l e : 
- 3 -
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( a ) F o r t h e e n t i r e r e n t d u e f o r t h e 
r e m a i n d e r of t h e t e r m ; 
( b ) F o r r e n t a c c r u e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 
n e c e s s a r y t o r e - r e n t t h e p r e m i s e s a t a f a i r r e n t a l 
v a l u e , p l u s t h e d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e f a i r r e n t a l 
v a l u e a n d t h e r e n t a g r e e d t o i n t h e p r i o r r e n t a l 
a g r e e m e n t , p l u s a r e a s o n a b l e commiss ion f o r t h e 
r e n t i n g of t h e p r e m i s e s a n d t h e c o s t s , i f a n y , 
n e c e s s a r y t o r e s t o r e t h e r e n t a l u n i t t o i t s 
c o n d i t i o n when r e n t e d by t h e t e n a n t l e s s normal 
w e a r a n d t e a r . T h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l a p p l y , i f 
l e s s t h a n s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e 
owner d i d n o t r e - r e n t t h e p r e m i s e s . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n b r o u g h t by t h e L a n d l o r d a g a i n s t t h e 
T e n a n t s e e k i n g r e c o v e r y 
a l l e g e d l y a b a n d o n i 
t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t 
L a n d l o r d , 
L a n d l o r d 
L a n d l o r d 
J u d i c i a l 
who r u l e d 
T e n a n t a b 
. ng t h e 
u n d e r t h e 
p r e m i s e s . 
v a c a t e d i n r e 
t h a t L a n d l 
a c c e p t e d 
s u f f e r e d 
D i s t r i c t 
a 
no 
o r d f a i l e 
s u r r e n d e r 
d a m a g e s . 
C o u r t 
t h a t p u r s u a n t t o 
a n d o n e d t h e 
b e f o r e 
\ l e a s e a g r e e m e n t f o r 
The T e n a n t d e f e n d e d on 
l i a n c e on an a g r e e m e n t 
d t o 
of 
T r i a 
i t h e 
Utah Code 
p r e m i s e s and 
m i t i g a t e d a m a g e s , 
t h e p r e m i s e s , and 
w i t h 
t h a t 
t h a t 
1 was h e l d in t h e T h i r d 
H o n o r a b l e David B, 
Ann. S e c t i o n 78-36-
. Dee 
- 1 2 . 3 
L a n d l o r d i s e n t i t l e d t o 
u n p a i d r e n t p u r s u a n t t o 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On o r a b o u t J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 7 4 , t h e T e n a n t Glad R a g s , I n c . , 
( h e r e i n a f t e r d e s i g n a t e d a s G l a d R a g s o r T e n a n t ) , a n d 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L a n d l o r d F a s h i o n Place Associa tes , (here inaf ter designated 
as F a s h i o n Place or Landlord), entered in to a wr i t ten lease 
ag reemen t fo r 1600 s q u a r e feet of commercial space in the 
F a s h i o n P l a c e M a l l fo r a 15 yea r t e rm w i t h r e n t a t 
approx imate ly $8.50 per square foot , or $1,133.33 per month. 
( E x h i b i t 1 , R. 4 7 7 ) . E r n e s t W. Hahn C o r p o r a t i o n is a 
l i m i t e d par tnersh ip which owns 81% of Fashion Place (R. 316) 
and owns a p p r o x i m a t e l y 35 malls (R. 323). The expi ra t ion 
d a t e of s a i d l e a s e was December 3 1 , 1989 (Exhibit 1, R. 
4 5 8 ) . D u r i n g 1979 and 1 9 8 1 , Glad Rags s i g n e d t h r e e 
a g r e e m e n t s w i th F a s h i o n P l a c e requir ing Fashion Place to 
a t t e m p t t o " s e l l " t h e demised p r e m i s e s , or find another 
l e s s e e t o t a k e over the Glad Rags premises and/or leasehold 
i m p r o v e m e n t s , t h e r e b y r e l e a s i n g Glad Rags from i t s Lease 
Agreement. (Exhibits 4, 5 and 6, R. 338, 339). None of the 
a t t e m p t s of F a s h i o n P l a c e t o " s e l l " t h e space were 
successful . (Exhibit 3, R. 376-377). 
In t h e f a l l of 1 9 8 1 , Glad Rags 1 P r e s i d e n t and the 
F a s h i o n Place Mall Manager met to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t e r m i n a t i n g t h e l e a s e and moving from the premises. (R. 
3 3 1 ) . During these meetings, Glad Rags indicated i t s in ten t 
t o l e a v e t h e p r e m i s e s a t t h e end of 1981. (R. 365, 366, 
- 5 -
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379 , 494 , E x h i b i t 7 ) . Glad Rags1 P r e s i d e n t b e l i e v e d t h a t 
t h e M a l l Manager r e l e a s e d Glad Rags from the l e a s e (R. 496) 
and t h a t t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t would work t o t he mutual b e n e f i t 
of b o t h p a r t i e s — t h e M a l l wou ld be a b l e t o i n c r e a s e i t s 
i n c o m e by i n c r e a s i n g the r e n t pa id by new l e s s e e s , and Glad 
R a g s w o u l d be a b l e t o c l o s e a m o d e r a t e l y p r o f i t a b l e 
l o c a t i o n . (R. 4 9 2 - 9 4 , 5 1 6 ) . During t hose m e e t i n g s , Glad 
Rags s t a t e d i t s i n t e n t i o n n o t t o p u r c h a s e more c l o t h i n g 
i n v e n t o r y f o r t h e F a s h i o n P l a c e s t o r e (R. 370-71) and no 
b u y i n g occur red (R. 504) . Glad Rags vaca ted the premises on 
December 3 1 , 1 9 8 1 . (R. 318) . No r e n t has been pa id s i n c e 
t h a t t i m e . (R. 318, 496) . 
S h o r t l y a f t e r J a n u a r y 1 , 1982, Glad Rags and Fashion 
P l a c e had s e v e r a l meet ings and c o n v e r s a t i o n s (R. 318, 386, 
3 8 7 , 452, 526) , Glad Rags r e t u r n e d the key (R. 454) , and the 
p a r t i e s a g r e e d to a l low Glad Rags t o s t o r e c e r t a i n i tems on 
t h e p r e m i s e s pending 48 hours 1 n o t i c e t o remove those i t e m s . 
(R. 38 8, 393-94, 451) . Glad Rags in tended t h a t t h o s e s t o r e d 
i t e m s b e o f f e r e d f o r s a l e t o t h e new l e s s e e t a k i n g 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s . (R. 511 , 540) . Glad 
Rags had a warehouse and adequate space to s t o r e t h e s e i tems 
i t s e l f (R. 5 1 2 , 5 1 9 ) i f an agreement could not have been 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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made w i t h F a s h i o n P l a c e . Glad Rags t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t never 
r e c e i v e d n o t i f i c a t i o n f rom F a s h i o n P l ace to remove sa id 
s t o r e d i t e m s . (R. 540) . Fashion P lace t e s t i f i e d t h a t such 
n o t i f i c a t i o n was g i v e n . (R. 4 5 1 ) . The i tems l e f t in the 
p r e m i s e s w e r e n e v e r r e t u r n e d to Glad Rags (R. 551) and a re 
no longer in the cus tody of Fashion P l a c e . (R. 488) . 
A f t e r G lad Rags1 d e p a r t u r e , Fashion P lace a t tempted to 
r e l e t t he demised p r e m i s e s . (R. 318) . Fashion Place quoted 
l e a s e r a t e s to p r o s p e c t i v e t e n a n t s of $15 t o $20 per square 
f o o t a n n u a l l y (R. 362, 365 f 508) p lus a lump sum payment of 
$ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . (R. 344, 411 , 412) . Fashion P l a c e ' s Mall Manager 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g the pe r iod of vacancy, the space was 
i m p o s s i b l e t o s e l l because of the economic c o n d i t i o n s . (R. 
382-383) . 
D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d p r i o r t o r e l e a s i n g t h e d e m i s e d 
p r e m i s e s , F a s h i o n P l a c e u t i l i z e d the premises for i t s own 
p u r p o s e s and b e n e f i t by h o l d i n g s e v e r a l meet ings of the 
F a s h i o n P l a c e M a l l M e r c h a n t A s s o c i a t i o n (R. 482-83) and 
s t o r i n g i tems be longing to o t h e r Mall t e n a n t s in the demised 
premises for a pe r iod of s i x weeks (R. 447) . 
A n o t h e r w o m a n ' s c l o t h i n g s t o r e , t h e C h a l k Garden, 
p r e s e n t e d a w r i t t e n o f f e r t o F a s h i o n P lace to l e a s e the 
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demised premises with rent beginning at approximately $8 per 
s q u a r e f o o t and e s c a l a t i n g t o $14 per square foot . (R. 
4 1 2 . ) This s to re would have met the tenant mix requirements 
of F a s h i o n P l a c e . (R. 3 3 3 ) . F a s h i o n P l a c e n e i t h e r 
r e s p o n d e d t o nor re jec ted the Chalk Garden of fer . (R. 412, 
413). 
On or abou t April 1, 1983, a f t e r 15 months of vacancy, 
F a s h i o n P l a c e l e a s e d t h e demised premises to two separate 
s t o r e s , Fleet Foot and Life Uniforms. (R. 391, 320). F lee t 
Foot a g r e e d to pay $30 per square foot for a five year term 
which e x p i r e s on approximately April 1, 1988. (R. 466-68). 
L i f e Uniforms signed a seven year lease with rent beginning 
a t $10 per s q u a r e f o o t annually and esca la t ing to $14 per 
s q u a r e f o o t over the term. (R. 462). Life Uniforms1 seven 
y e a r l e a s e e x t e n d s p a s t t h e December 31, 1990 expi ra t ion 
date of Glad Rags1 l e a s e . (R. 471). 
Under t h e t e rms of Glad Rags 1 l e a s e , Fashion Place 
r e c e i v e d $ 1 , 1 3 3 . 3 3 in month ly r en t a l payments or $13,600 
a n n u a l l y . (R. 458). Fashion Place al leged a rent arrearage 
of $ 2 4 , 4 6 7 . 8 7 when the premises were r e l e t . (R. 322). The 
ba se r e n t F a s h i o n P l a c e receives from Fleet Foot and Life 
Uniforms on t h e demised premises i s at l e a s t $2,606.67 per 
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m o n t h . (R. 4 7 8 ) . T h i s amounts t o an i n c r e a s e in monthly 
i n c o m e to Fashion P lace of $1 ,472 .33 (R. 478) . The r e n t for 
t h e 15 month p e r i o d of v a c a n c y was s a t i s f i e d by the new 
t e n a n t s i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 17 months, or two months p r i o r t o 
the d a t e of the t r i a l . (R. 478-479) . 
From t h e t i m e Glad Rags vaca ted the p r e m i s e s , December 
3 1 , 1 9 8 1 , t o t h e d a t e of t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e l e a s e , 
D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 8 9 , F a s h i o n P l a c e wou ld h a v e r e c e i v e d 
$ 1 0 8 , 8 0 0 from Glad Rags. (R. 460-61) . Under t he new l e a s e s 
w i t h F l e e t F o o t and L i f e U n i f o r m s , F a s h i o n P l a c e w i l l 
r e c e i v e a p p r o x i m a t e l y $116,400 from F l e e t Foot (R. 468) and 
$ 4 8 , 0 0 0 f rom Life Uniforms (R. 471) for a t o t a l of a t l e a s t 
$ 1 6 4 , 4 0 0 f o r t h e same p e r i o d . In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s amount, 
F a s h i o n P l a c e w i l l r e c e i v e a d d i t i o n a l i n c o m e from the 
e s c a l a t i n g L i f e Uniforms1 l e a s e (R. 470) and 1 1/2 yea r s of 
a d d i t i o n a l r e n t f rom t h e p r e m i s e s l e a s e d t o F l e e t Foot , 
whose l e a s e e x p i r e s i n A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 . (R. 4 7 1 - 4 7 2 ) . The 
r e a s o n a b l e r e n t a l r a t e v a l u e fo r the demised premises on 
December 3 1 , 1981 was $15 t o $20 per square foot annua l ly or 
$192,000 over the e i g h t year l e a s e term (R. 476-77) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 . As a m a t t e r of l a w , Glad Rags 1 d e p a r t u r e from 
t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e an abandonment 
u n d e r U t a h C o d e A n n . S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 b e c a u s e Glad Rags 
n o t i f i e d F a s h i o n P l a c e t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o v a c a t e t h e 
p r e m i s e s a n d h a d s e v e r a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h F a s h i o n P l a c e 
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r i t s d e p a r t u r e . As a r e s u l t , t h e damages 
s e t f o r t h in 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e t o F a s h i o n P l a c e . 
ISSUE 2 . F a s h i o n P l a c e i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o any r e c o v e r y 
f r o m G l a d R a g s u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e or common law 
b e c a u s e i t w i l l r e c e i v e s u b s t a n t i a l l y more r e n t a l income 
o v e r t h e l e a s e t e r m from t h e new l e s s e e s t h a n i t would have 
r e c e i v e d from Glad R a g s . Because F a s h i o n P l a c e has s u f f e r e d 
no a c t u a l d a m a g e s , i t i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o be p u t in a b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n t h a n i f Glad Rags had r e m a i n e d on t h e p r e m i s e s . 
ISSUE 3 . G l a d R a g s 1 a c t i o n of d e p a r t i n g f rom t h e 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s c o n s t i t u t e d a s u r r e n d e r t o F a s h i o n P l a c e , 
a n d F a s h i o n P l a c e ' s a c t i o n s i n t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n , c o n d u c t i n g 
M a l l m e e t i n g s , a n d s t o r i n g o t h e r m e r c h a n t ' s goods on t h e 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s c o n s t i t u t e d a n a c c e p t a n c e of Glad R a g s ' 
s u r r e n d e r and t e r m i n a t e d t h e l e a s e a s a m a t t e r of l a w . 
ISSUE 4 . F a s h i o n P l a c e f a i l e d t o m i t i g a t e i t s damages 
a n d f a i l e d t o r e - l e t t h e p r e m i s e s by q u o t i n g p e r s p e c t i v e 
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l e s s e e s t h e r a t e of $15 t o $20 per square foot annually, 
a l m o s t t w i c e Glad Rags 1 r e s e r v e d r e n t a l r a t e , and by 
r e q u i r i n g an addi t iona l $20,000 payment before a perspect ive 
l e s s e e could occupy the premises. Fashion Place also fa i l ed 
t o m i t i g a t e by f a i l i n g t o a c c e p t a wr i t ten proposal from 
a n o t h e r woman's c l o t h i n g s t o r e t o occupy t h e demised 
premises at a higher rent over the term. 
ISSUE 5. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s award of 1/2 of the damages 
p r a y e d for by F a s h i o n P l a c e i s not subs tan t i a t ed by any 
evidence in the record and cannot be sus ta ined. 
ISSUE 6. Fashion Place acted as ba i lee of the items i t 
a l l o w e d to be l e f t in the demised premises by Glad Rags, and 
b r e a c h e d i t s d u t y as b a i l e e when i t f a i l e d t o t a k e 
r e a s o n a b l e s t eps to re turn the bai led items and notify Glad 
Rags of i t s i n t e n t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e bailment agreement. 
F a s h i o n P l a c e a l s o breached the bailment agreement when i t 
l o s t c o n t r o l of t h e bai led items and no longer has them in 
i t s possession. 
ISSUE 7. Glad R a g s ' Counterclaim demanding re turn of 
i t s s e c u r i t y d e p o s i t was not addressed in the Findings and 
C o n c l u s i o n s , and t h i s f a i l u r e to ru le on a mater ia l issue 
cons t i t u t e s r eve r s ib l e e r r o r . 
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ISSUE 8 . U n d e r t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t , G l a d Rags i s 
e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i f i t i s t h e p r e v a i l i n g 
p a r t y i n t h i s a c t i o n . 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 . 
GLAD RAGS' DEPARTURE FROM FASHION PLACE DOES NOT 
C O N S T I T U T E ABANDONMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 OR 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 . 
U n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
G l a d R a g s m e t w i t h F a s h i o n P l a c e p r i o r t o December 3 1 , 1981 
a n d e x p r e s s e d i t s i n t e n d t o v a c a t e t h e p r e m i s e s on t h a t 
d a t e . The p a r t i e s had s e v e r a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and m e e t i n g s 
(R . 3 1 8 ) s u b s e q u e n t t o Glad R a g s ' d e p a r t u r e c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
p r o p e r t y ( R . 3 8 6 ) f and t h e i t e m s r e t a i n e d on t h e p r e m i s e s (R. 
388 ) . G l a d R a g s p a i d no r e n t t o F a s h i o n P l a c e on t h e 
demi sed p r e m i s e s a f t e r December 3 1 , 1981 (R. 3 1 8 , 4 9 6 ) . 
F a s h i o n P l a c e c l a i m s t h a t t h e s e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t e an 
a b a n d o n m e n t u n d e r U t a h C o d e S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 a n d 
7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 . These s e c t i o n s s t a t e : 
78-36-12.3 Def init ions . 
(3) "Abandonment" i s presumed in e i t he r of 
the following s i t u a t i o n s : 
( a ) The t e n a n t has not no t i f i ed the owner 
t h a t he or she w i l l be absent from the premises, 
and t h e t e n a n t f a i l s t o pay rent within 15 days 
a f t e r t h e due d a t e , and t h e r e i s no reasonable 
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e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n the presence of the t e n a n t ' s 
p e r s o n a l property tha t the tenant i s occupying the 
premises; or 
(b) The t e n a n t has not no t i f i ed the owner 
t h a t he or she w i l l be absent from the premises, 
and t h e t e n a n t f a i l s to pay rent when due and the 
t e n a n t ' s p e r s o n a l property has been removed from 
t h e d w e l l i n g u n i t and t h e r e i s no r e a s o n a b l e 
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e t e n a n t i s o c c u p y i n g t h e 
premises. 
7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 6 • Abandoned premises - retaking 
and r e r e n t i n g by owner - l i a b i l i t y of tenant -
p e r s o n a l property of tenant l e f t on premises. In 
the event of abandonment the owner may: 
(1) R e t a k e t h e premises and attempt to rent 
them a t f a i r r e n t a l v a l u e and t h e t e n a n t who 
abandoned the premises sha l l be l i a b l e : 
( a ) F o r t h e e n t i r e r e n t d u e f o r t h e 
r e m a i n d e r of t h e t e r m ; 
( b ) For r e n t a c c r u e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 
n e c e s s a r y to r e - r en t the premises at a f a i r r en t a l 
v a l u e , plus the difference between the f a i r r en t a l 
v a l u e and t h e r e n t agreed to in the pr ior r en t a l 
a g r e e m e n t , p l u s a r e a s o n a b l e commission for the 
r e n t i n g of t h e p r e m i s e s and t h e c o s t s , if any, 
n e c e s s a r y t o r e s t o r e t h e r e n t a l u n i t t o i t s 
c o n d i t i o n when r e n t e d by the tenant l e s s normal 
wear and t e a r . Th i s subsec t i on sha l l apply, if 
l e s s t h a n subsect ion (a) notwithstanding tha t the 
owner did not r e - r en t the premises. 
For abandonment to be presumed, the factual 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of 78-36-12.3(3) must be met. The presumption 
of abandonment , i f e s t a b l i s h e d , i s not conclusive, but is 
r e b u t t a b l e . Concerning presumptions, the Utah Supreme Court 
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in Hoffman v . L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co, of Nor th America, 669 
P.2d 410, 420 (Utah 1983) s t a t e d : 
. . . A l t h o u g h the law frequently employs the 
p r o p o s i t i o n tha t one intends the na tu ra l probable 
r e s u l t s of h i s conduct in t o r t and criminal law, 
as w e l l as other areas of the law, a ru le based on 
t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y o n l y a r u l e of 
e v i d e n c e g i v i n g r i s e t o an i n f e r e n c e , not a 
c o n c l u s i v e presumption or a sh i f t in the burden of 
p r o o f . Sans t rom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. 
Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed.2d 39 (1979). 
A presumption of abandonment i s therefore only evidence 
g i v i n g r i s e to an inference of abandonment, not a conclusive 
p r e s u m p t i o n or a s h i f t in the burden of proof. The burden 
of proof of e s t ab l i sh ing an abandonment under Utah Code Ann. 
S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 has not been met because Fashion Place 
f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e f a c t s in t h i s case meet the 
c r i t e r i a set for th in subsections (a) and (b) of 78-36-12.3. 
S u b s e c t i o n (a) and (b) f ac tua l ly requi re tha t no not ice 
has been g i v e n t o the owner tha t the tenant wi l l be absent 
from t h e p remises . The uncontraverted evidence e s t ab l i shes 
t h a t F a s h i o n P l a c e had no t ice tha t Glad Rags would vacate 
t h e p r e m i s e s (R. 365). In add i t ion , immediately a f te r Glad 
R a g s v a c a t e d t h e p r e m i s e s s e v e r a l more m e e t i n g s and 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s be tween t h e p a r t i e s t ook p l a c e (R. 318), 
w h e r e i n t h e p a r t i e s d i s c u s s e d the re turn of the secur i ty 
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d e p o s i t (R. 386) and leaving items of personal property on 
t h e p r e m i s e fo r s t o r a g e or for s a l e t o t h e subsequent 
l e s s e e . (R. 318, 386, 387, 452, 526-527). 
Abandonment under Utah Code Ann. Section 78-36-12.3(3) 
must be i n t e r p r e t e d according to the designated de f in i t ion 
t o avo id n o n s e n s i c a l and absurd r e s u l t s . Mi l l e t t v. Clark 
C l i n i c C o r p . , 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . In Cannon v. 
McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
In i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a tu to ry language care 
must be t a k e n t o c o n s t r u e the words in l i gh t of 
t h e t o t a l context of the l e g i s l a t i o n , and when the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a sect ion involves technica l words 
and p h r a s e s which a r e d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e , the 
p r o v i s i o n must be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g to such 
pecul iar and appropria te meaning or d e f i n i t i o n . 
The s e c t i o n s defining abandonment are not appl icable to the 
f a c t s in t h i s matter because of the not ice to Fashion Place 
and t h e c o n t i n u i n g communica t ion between the p a r t i e s . A 
f i n d i n g of abandonment c i r c u m v e n t s t h e i n t e n t of t h e 
l e g i s l a t u r e and l eads to the nonsensical and absurd r e s u l t 
of e l i m i n a t i n g the "no t i f i ca t ion to owner" requirements from 
S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 and award ing recovery to an uninjured 
pa r ty . 
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In s i t u a t i o n s where t h e meaning of a s t a t u t e i s 
u n c e r t a i n , i t i s proper to consider the p r a c t i c a l aspects of 
i t s o p e r a t i o n in order to determine the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . 
S t a t e v . S a l t Lake City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 
2d 56 , 368 P. 2d 468 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . If t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a 
s t a t u t e l e a d s t o incongruous r e s u l t s , i t should not be so 
appl ied . 
. . .But s t a t u t e s of n e c e s s i t y must s t a t e 
t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s in general language. I t i s not 
a l w a y s p o s s i b l e t o f o r e s e e and p r e s c r i b e in 
p r e c i s e d e t a i l fo r a l l s i t u a t i o n s to which they 
might a p p l y . Attempts to give them universa l and 
l i t e r a l app l ica t ion frequently lead to incongruous 
r e s u l t s which were neve r i n t e n d e d . When i t i s 
o b v i o u s tha t t h i s i s so, the s t a t u t e should not be 
so a p p l i e d . In o r d e r t o give a s t a t u t e i t s t rue 
meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e i t should be considered 
in t h e l i g h t of i t s background and the purpose 
sough t t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d , t o g e t h e r with other 
a s p e c t s of t h e law which have a bearing on the 
problem involved. 
Snyder v . C l u n e , 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964). 
The abandonment s t a t u t e was never intended to go beyond the 
s p e c i f i c f a c t s p resen ted in the d e f i n i t i o n . To ignore the 
f a c t u a l requirements would give the s t a t u t e a more universa l 
a p p l i c a t i o n than intended and lead to the incongruous r e s u l t 
of g r a n t i n g damages t o an uninjured pa r ty . Fashion Place 
w i l l a l m o s t d o u b l e i t s re turn on the demised premises over 
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t h e t e rm of t h e l e a s e . To g r a n t unpa id rent to Fashion 
P l a c e c o n s t i t u t e s a windfall which was never contemplated or 
intended under t h i s s t a t u t e . 
The abandonment s t a t u t e i s intended to give a remedy to 
t h e l a n d l o r d whose t e n a n t disappears or i s not in contact 
w i th t h e l a n d l o r d concerning the leasehold. Under the old 
Utah law, in o r d e r for a landlord to be completely safe in 
t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n of l e a s e d premises, the landlord had to 
f i l e a c t i o n for e v i c t i o n or for unlawful de t a ine r . If the 
t e n a n t cou ld not be found, the P l a i n t i f f had to publish a 
summons and c o m p l a i n t which took long periods of time to 
c o m p l e t e and s u b j e c t e d the landlord to claims of forc ib le 
e n t r y and de ta iner if he reposessed or r e l e t the property to 
m i t i g a t e damages. To remedy t h i s cumbersome process and to 
a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t t h e l a n d l o r d , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e passed 
Sections 78-36-12.3 and 78-36-12.6. 
In f i n d i n g t h a t Glad Rags had "abandoned" the premises 
t h e t r i a l cou r t misapplied the law. The standard of review 
on a p p e a l where the law has been misapplied i s se t forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
The s t a n d a r d for appe l la te review of fac tua l 
f i n d i n g s a f f o r d s g r e a t d e f e r e n c e t o the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s view of t h e e v i d e n c e u n l e s s the t r i a l 
c o u r t has m i s a p p l i e d the law or i t s f indings are 
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c l e a r l y a g a i n s t t h e we igh t of t h e e v i d e n c e . 
Pagano v . W a l k e r , U t a h , 539 P .2d 452 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; 
Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980). 
G a r c i a v . Schwendiman, 645 P .2d 6 5 1 , 653 (Utah 1982). 
See a l s o , Ute Cal Land Development v. Intermountain Stock 
Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
I t i s c l e a r from t h e te rms and in t en t of the s t a t u t e 
t h a t t h e f a c t s and circumstances surrounding the departure 
of Glad Rags from the demised premises does not c o n s t i t u t e 
an "abandonment" . Glad Rags did not "abandon" the premises 
b e c a u s e t h e uncontroverted fac ts e s t ab l i sh tha t i t no t i f i ed 
F a s h i o n P l a c e of i t s i n t e n t t o depart (R. 365). Several 
m e e t i n g s and c o n v e r s a t i o n s be tween the p a r t i e s occurred 
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r Glad Rags d e p a r t e d (R. 3 8 7 ) . The 
abandonment s t a t u t e was i n t e n d e d for s i t u a t i o n s d i s t i n c t 
from t h e c a s e a t b a r . F a s h i o n P l a c e i s t h e r e f o r e not 
e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r y from Glad Rags under t h i s s t a t u t e and 




FASHION PLACE I S NOT ENTITLED TO COLLECT UNPAID 
RENT UNDER THE LEASE AGREEMENT OR COMMON LAW AND 
I S ONLY E N T I T L E D TO BE PLACED IN AS GOOD A 
POSITION AS I F GLAD RAGS HAD NOT DEPARTED FROM 
FASHION PLACE MALL. 
( 
The record indicates that under the terms of Glad Rags' 
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l e a s e , F a s h i o n P l a c e would r e c e i v e $1 ,133 .33 per month in 
l e a s e p a y m e n t s (R. 4 7 7 ) . The b a s e r e n t F a s h i o n P l ace 
r e c e i v e s f rom t h e F l e e t F o o t and L i f e U n i f o r m s on the 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s i s a t l e a s t $ 2 , 6 0 6 . 6 7 p e r month or a 
d i f f e r e n c e of $ 1 , 4 7 3 . 3 4 per month above the Glad Rags r e n t 
(R. 4 7 8 ) . The r e n t a r r e a r a g e due t o Fashion P lace under the 
Glad Rags l e a s e f o r 15 m o n t h s of v a c a n c y , claimed to be 
$ 2 4 , 4 6 7 . 8 7 (R. 4 7 8 ) , was s a t i s f i e d w i th in a pe r iod of 17 
m o n t h s (R. 4 7 8 ) , o r two months p r i o r t o the t r i a l , by the 
i n c r e a s e d r e n t a l payments from F l e e t Foot and Life Uniforms 
(2 4 , 4 6 7 . 8 7 unpa id r e n t d iv ided by 1 ,473 .34 , the payments in 
e x c e s s of Glad R a g s 1 r e n t e a c h month = 1 6 . 6 1 months t o 
s a t i s f y the a r r e a r a g e . ) (R. 477-479) . Over the e n t i r e term 
of t h e Glad Rags l e a s e , F a s h i o n P l a c e M a l l would have 
r e c e i v e d $108,800 in r e n t from Glad Rags (R. 460) . Over the 
same p e r i o d , and with the e x i s t i n g l e a s e s of F l e e t Foot and 
L i f e U n i f o r m s , Fashion P lace w i l l r e c e i v e a t l e a s t $164,400 
(R. 4 7 4 ) , n o t i n c l u d i n g a d d i t i o n a l r e n t a l income a v a i l a b l e 
f rom t h e e s c a l a t i n g L i f e Un i fo rms l e a s e (R. 462) and the 
r e r e n t a l of t h e F l e e t Foot space a f t e r F l e e t Foot f s l e a s e 
e x p i r e s in A p r i l , 1988, approximate ly 1 1/2 yea r s before the 
e x p i r a t i o n of the Glad Rags l e a s e (R. 468) . 
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RENT PAYMENTS 
Per foot Month Annual Total to 12/31/1989 
Glad Rags $8.50 ($1,133.33) ($13,600.00) ($108,800.00) 
Fleet Foot 30.00 1,940.00 23,280.00 116,400.002 
Life ^ 
Uniforms 10.00 666.66 8,000.00 48,000.00 
Excess to Fashion 
Place above 
Glad Rags L e a s e 1 , 4 7 2 . 3 3 1 7 , 6 8 0 . 0 0 5 2 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 
F a i r Marke t
 1 
Value 1 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 9 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1. F a i r market value es tab l i shed as $15 to $20 per square foot 
annual ly. 
2 . F l e e t F o o t ' s l e a s e t e rm i s five years , expir ing April 1, 
1988 . Fashion Place wi l l be able to lease t h i s space from April 
1 , 1988 t h r o u g h December 31 , 1989 and receive add i t iona l r en t s 
not included above. 
3 . L i f e U n i f o r m ' s l e a s e extends beyond the December 31 , 1989 
t e r m . T h i s f igure represents only the income payable to Fashion 
Place during the term. 
(Record p. 459-481). 
The l e a s e p r o v i d e s for two methods of determining the 
d a m a g e s t o which F a s h i o n P l a c e may be e n t i t l e d : t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e r e a s o n a b l e r e n t a l v a l u e of the 
demised p r e m i s e s and the reserved ren t ; and the dif ference 
be tween the rent reserved in the lease and the r en t a l income 
- 2 0 -
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a f t e r t h e premises have been r e l e t . (See Appendix I ) . The 
common law r u l e s t a t e s t h a t t h e l a n d l o r d ' s damages are 
measured by t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the f a i r market r en t a l 
and t h e r e s e r v e d ren t amount under the l ea se . This i s the 
same t e s t provided in the l e a s e . 
P a r a g r a p h (a) of t h e l e a s e ag reemen t a l l o w s t h e 
l a n d l o r d t o immediately declare the term ended and re -en te r 
t h e p r e m i s e s , t h u s t e r m i n a t i n g t h e t e n a n t ' s l e a s e . 
P a r a g r a p h (c ) a l s o d e a l s with te rminat ion , but allows the 
l a n d l o r d t o r e l e t t h e p r e m i s e s and t h e r e a f t e r e l ec t to 
t e r m i n a t e t h e l e a se . The provis ions of the lease d e t a i l i n g 
t h e l a n d l o r d ' s recovery combines subparagraphs (a) and (c) 
in to one formula as follows: 
Should t h e L a n d l o r d e l ec t to terminate t h i s 
Lease under the provis ions of subparagraphs (a) or 
(c) a b o v e , t h e Landlord sha l l thereupon, without 
w a i t i n g f o r t h e end of t h e t e rm h e r e o f , be 
e n t i t l e d to recover from the Tenant as damages the 
d i f f e r e n c e , i f any , between the then reasonable 
r e n t a l value of the premises for the period of the 
t e rm r e s e r v e d in t h e Lease and t h e amount of 
r e n t a l and other charges payable by the Tenant for 
t h e b a l a n c e of t h e te rm of t h i s Lease, together 
with the rent then unpaid if any. 
Fashion Place Lease, Ar t i c l e 22, page 23 (Exhibit 1 ) . 
Th i s p r o v i s i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s the common law theory of 
r e c o v e r y i n t o t h e l e a s e agreement. The reasonable r en t a l 
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v a l u e was es tab l i shed at $15 to $20 per square foot annually 
fo r a t o t a l of at l e a s t $192f000 over the term (R. 476-477). 
The r e s e r v e d r e n t was $8 .50 per square foot , or $108,000 
over t h e t e rm (R. 4 6 0 - 6 1 ) . Because the f a i r market value 
e x c e e d s t h e r e s e r v e d r e n t , no r e c o v e r y i s ava i lab le to 
Fashion Place under t h i s lease provision or the common law. 
S u b p a r a g r a p h (b) of the lease allows Fashion Place to 
r e e n t e r t h e premises and r e - l e a s e the premises on behalf of 
Glad Rags fo r any terms which sha l l be deemed proper by the 
landlord . The landlord sha l l then: 
. . . c o l l e c t said rent and any other rent tha t may < 
t h e r e a f t e r become p a y a b l e and a p p l y t h e same 
t o w a r d s the amount due or the rea f t e r to become due 
from the tenant and on account of such expenses of 
such r e l e t t i n g and other damages sustained by the 
landlord; 
i 
Fashion Place Lease, Article 22, page 22 (Exhibit 1). 
Under this provision, the rent collected from the new 
lessees must be applied towards the amount due or thereafter 
i 
to become due from Glad Rags. The rent received by Fashion 
Place from the new lessees in the demised premises exceeds 
Glad Rags' lease payment and was sufficient to make up the 
outstanding balance of rent not received during the period 
( 
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of v a c a n c y . T h e r e f o r e , under t h i s provision of the l e a se , 
Fashion Place i s not e l i g i b l e to recover damages. 
A l though t h e r e a r e no Findings and Conclusions by the 
t r i a l c o u r t on damages under the l e a s e , the wr i t ten lease 
a g r e e m e n t need not be remanded t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t for 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and f ind ings . 
. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e c o n t r a c t in 
q u e s t i o n , t h i s court deals with a question of law. 
As s u c h , t h e same deference need not be accorded 
t h e lower c o u r t ' s p o s i t i o n as we would accord 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t . See Polk v . K o e r n e r , 111 
A r i z . 4 9 3 , 533 P.2d 660 (1975); Rooney v. Vermont 
I n v . Corp . , 10 Cal . 3d 351, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 
515 P.2d 297 (1973). 
Provo C i t y Corp . v . N i e l s o n Sco t t Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 
( 1 9 7 9 ) . See a l s o , O'Hara v . H a l l , 628 P .2d 1289 (Utah 
1 9 8 1 ) ; Arnold Mach inery Co. v . Ba l l s , 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1981). 
Under t h e common law t h e o r y of r e c o v e r y , the U. S. 
Cour t of A p p e a l s , ru l ing on a case a r i s ing in the D i s t r i c t 
Court of Utah, s t a t ed : 
. . . l i k e t h e t r i a l court and the p a r t i e s , 
o u r s e a r c h h a s not u n c o v e r e d any Utah c a s e 
p r e s c r i b i n g a fo rmula fo r t h e ascertainment of 
damages r e s u l t i n g from an an t i c ipa to ry breach, or 
p r e m a t u r e t e r m i n a t i o n , of a l e a s e or r e n t a l 
c o n t r a c t . We a g r e e , t h e r e f o r e , with the t r i a l 
c o u r t t h a t the general ru le is to the affect tha t 
t h e t e n a n t ' s damage i s measured by the difference 
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between the present value of the reserved rent and 
t h e p r e s e n t f a i r r e n t a l value of the remainder, 
t h e two of which are presumed to be the same. . •. 
[ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] In o t h e r w o r d s , i t i s 
presumed t h a t in the event of a breach, t ha t the 
l e s s o r wi l l be able to r e - r e n t the leased premises 
fo r t h e amount of the reserved rent without loss 
or damage. B u t , t h i s presumption, as a l l other 
p r e s u m p t i o n s in law and f ac t , may be disputed or 
rebut ted by competent and re levant f a c t s . 
C. D. S t imson Co. v. P o r t e r , 195 F .2d 410, 413 (10 Cir . 
1 9 5 2 ) . See a l s o , Gordon v. C o n s o l i d a t e d Sun Ray, I n c . , 
195 Kan. 3 4 1 , 404 P.2d 949 (1965); Jones v. McQuesten, 172 
Wash. 480, 20 P.2d 838, 840 (1933). 
A s i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n i s found in 51 C . J . S . , Landlord 
and Tenant, Section 250(2)(f): 
W r o n g f u l A b a n d o n m e n t o r S u r r e n d e r of 
Premi s e s . I f t h e l e s s e e wrongfully abandons or 
s u r r e n d e r s t h e l e a sed premises, he i s l i a b l e for 
t h e damages a c t u a l l y s u s t a i n e d by t h e l e s s o r , 
a l t h o u g h the lease contains no provision as to the 
amount of damages for the breach. The measure of 
d a m a g e s i n s u c h a c a s e h a s been h e l d t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e between the agreed rent for the balance 
of t h e term and the ac tua l or f a i r r e n t a l value of 
t h e p r e m i s e s , at the time of the breach; or where 
t h e l e s s o r , by the exerc ise of reasonable e f f o r t s , 
has r e l e t t h e premises, the measure of damages i s 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the rent s t i pu l a t ed in the 
l e a s e and t h e sum received from the other persons 
fo r t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e t e r m ; . . . [emphasis 
added]. 
T h i s l ega l au thor i ty e s t ab l i shes a presumption tha t the 
l e s s o r wi l l be able to r e - r e n t the premises for at l e a s t the 
i 
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amount of the reserved rent, and therefore sustain no loss 
or damage. Fashion Place has failed to adequately rebut 
this presumption, and has, in fact, substantiated the terms 
of the presumption by renting the premises in excess of the 
reasonable rental value. The reasonable rental value of $15 
to $20 per square foot annually (R. 476-477) exceeded the 
amount of rent reserved under the lease, and it is therefore 
presumed that the Plaintiff suffered no damages and is not 
entitled to recovery. 
F a s h i o n P l a c e i s not e n t i t l e d to be p laced in a b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n t h a n i t wou ld h a v e b e e n i n had Glad Rags not 
v a c a t e d t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s . The Utah Supreme Court has 
s t a t e d : 
The a s s e s s m e n t of damages by the t r i a l cou r t was 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p a l w h i c h 
u n d e r l i e s t h e a s c e r t a i n m e n t of damages for breach 
of c o n t r a c t : That the non-breaching p a r t y should 
r e c e i v e an award which would put him in as good a 
p o s i t i o n as he would have been in had t h e r e been 
no b r each . 
K e l l e r v . D e s e r e t M o r t u a r y Co . , 23 U t a h 2d 1, 455 P.2d 
1 9 7 , 1 9 8 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . S e e a l s o , C l a y t o n v . C r o s s r o a d s 
Equipment Co . , 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) . 
The Utah Supreme Court a l s o s t a t e d : 
Damages a r e p r o p e r l y measured by the amount 
n e c e s s a r y t o p l a c e the non-breach ing p a r t y in as 
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g o o d a p o s i t i o n as i f t h e c o n t r a c t had been 
performed. 
A l e x a n d e r v . Brown, 646 P. 2d 692 (Utah 1982). See a l s o , 
Utah Farm P r o d u c t i o n C r e d i t Associa t ion v. Cox, 627 P. 2d 
62 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) ; M i l l e r Pont iac , Inc . v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 
800 (Utah 1981). 
T h i s same p r i n c i p a l has been d e f i n e d in d e t a i l 
concerning the breach of a l ease : 
G e n e r a l l y , a P l a i n t i f f suf fer ing injury i s 
e n t i t l e d on ly t o a c a u s e of a c t i o n for damages 
ac tua l ly sus ta ined . . . . 
" ( I ) t s e e m s t o be t h e r u l e of 
g e n e r a l app l i ca t ion , tha t in a l l ac t ions 
on c o n t r a c t , sounding in damages . . . 
t h e P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o recover 
damages only to the extent of the injury 
s u s t a i n e d . If circumstances ex i s t which 
m i t i g a t e t h e i n j u r y , t h e y must be 
considered in measuring the damages." 
T h i s g e n e r a l r u l e w o u l d a l s o c o n t r o l 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the measure of damages normally 
t o be a p p l i e d in c a s e s of b r e a c h of a l e a s e 
ag reement . This measure of "actual lo s s" has been 
s e t f o r t h in numerous cases which ind ica te tha t 
damages for breach of cont rac t are compensatory in 
n a t u r e , in r e s t i t u t i o n for the harm caused, and 
s h o u l d only make the injured par ty whole again, or 
in t h e p o s i t i o n he would have been in had the 
c o n t r a c t been p e r f o r m e d , and not in a b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n t h a n i f t h e r e had been p e r f o r m a n c e , 
[ c i t a t i o n s ommitted.] 
. • • 
On t h e b a s i s of t h i s p r i n c i p a l , the landlord 
would be e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r on ly h i s a c t u a l 
l o s s e s and the excess rent received by [ P l a i n t i f f ] 
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b e c a u s e of t h e b r e a c h and abandonment by 
[ D e f e n d a n t ] would be a p p l i e d t o t h e c red i t of 
[ D e f e n d a n t ] t o t h e e x t e n t of damages owed by 
[Defendant] to [ P l a i n t i f f ] . 
• • • 
"The r e n t due from the o r ig ina l lessee 
i s t o be c r e d i t e d with such rent as i s 
r e a l i z e d from t h e r e - l e t t i n g . The 
l e s s o r i s e n t i t l e d to such sum as sha l l 
be e q u a l t o t h e r e n t s r equ i red by the 
t e r m s of the lease to be paid during the 
f u l l t e r m , and no t any g r e a t e r sum." 
(Emphasis added). 
There a p p e a r s t o be g e n e r a l agreement tha t 
t h e l e s s e e who breaches a lease i s e n t i t l e d to a 
r e n t c r e d i t f o r any p r o c e e d s g a i n e d by t h e 
l a n d l o r d from r e l e t t i n g during the period of the 
o r i g i n a l lease term. 
Wanderer v . P l a i n s f i e l d Carton Corp. f 40 111. App. 3d 552, 
351 N.E.2d 630, 635 (1976). 
F a s h i o n P l a c e i s not e n t i t l e d to recover any unpaid 
r e n t in t h i s m a t t e r . The ex i s t ing leases with Fleet Foot 
and Li fe Uniforms have t o t a l l y compensated Fashion Place for 
t h e t ime t h e s p a c e was vacant pr ior to the t r i a l (R. 478). 
F a s h i o n P l a c e has s u f f e r e d no ac tual l o s s , cannot recover 
under t h e l e a s e or common law, and i s not e n t i t l e d to be 
p l a c e d in a l e t t e r pos i t ion than i t would have been in had 
Glad Rags remained on the premises by receiving unpaid rent 
in addi t ion to the increased r e n t a l . 
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ISSUE 3 
FASHION PLACE ACCEPTED THE SURRENDER OF GLAD RAGS 
PREMISES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A f t e r G l a d R a g s v a c a t e d t h e demised p r e m i s e s , F a s h i o n 
P l a c e u t i l i z e d t h e p r e m i s e s f o r i t s own b e n e f i t and f o r i t s 
own p u r p o s e s . U n c o n t r a d i c t e d t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e 
M a l l h e l d s e v e r a l m e e t i n g s of t h e F a s h i o n P l a c e M a l l 
M e r c h a n t A s s o c i a t i o n i n t h e demised p r e m i s e s (R. 4 8 2 ) , and 
t h a t c h a i r s and o t h e r f i x t u r e s were u t i l i z e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s
 4 
fo r t h e p u r p o s e of c o n d u c t i n g t h e s e meetings. (R. 542). 
F a s h i o n P l a c e a l l o w e d o the r ind iv iduals to s to re f ix tu re s 
and goods in the premises to the exclusion of Glad Rags and < 
wi th no mone ta ry compensat ion or benefi t to Glad Rags (R. 
447 , 4 8 3 ) . In a d d i t i o n , Fashion Place leased a por t ion of 
t h e p r o p e r t y to Life Uniforms for a term which extends past < 
the o r ig ina l term of Glad Rags (R. 471). 
The Utah Supreme Cour t has def ined and accepted the 
d o c t r i n e of s u r r e n d e r in Belanger v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, ' < 
272 P . 2 d 173 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . The c o u r t s t a t e d : 
A s u r r e n d e r may t a k e p l a c e where t h e r e i s an 
e x p r e s s a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s o r by o p e r a t i o n 
of l a w . . . As s t a t e d i n 32 Am. J u r . , L a n d l o r d & < 
T e n a n t , S e c t i o n 9 0 5 : 
"A s u r r e n d e r o f t h e l e a s e by 
o p e r a t i o n of l a w r e s u l t s from any a c t s 
w h i c h imply m u t u a l c o n s e n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
of t h e e x p r e s s i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s '. • < 
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t h a t t h e i r ac t s sha l l have tha t e f fec t ; 
i t i s by way of es toppe l . However, the 
i n t e n t i o n of the landlord to accept the 
t e n a n t ' s s u r r e n d e r of t h e premises i s 
i m p o r t a n t on t h e quest ion of surrender 
by o p e r a t i o n of l aw, and a su r render 
w i l l not be i m p l i e d against the in ten t 
of t h e p a r t i e s , as m a n i f e s t by t h e i r 
CIL> L. O / • • • • 
A s u r r e n d e r as a m a t t e r of law may therefore r e su l t from 
a c t s which imply a mutua l c o n s e n t t o t e r m i n a t e a lease 
independent of the express in ten t ion of the p a r t i e s . Id. 
On the question of in ten t implied from ones ac ts the U t a h 
Utah Supreme Gourt has also s t a t e d : 
I t i s on ly when he [the landlord] exerc ises 
domin ion over t h e premises beyond those purposes 
and i n c o n s i s t e n t with the r i gh t s of a tenant whom 
he s e e k s t o hold for the r en t a l of the premises, 
t h a t a f i n d i n g of s u r r e n d e r i s j u s t i f i e d . John 
C. C u t l e r A s s o c i a t i o n v . De J a y Stores , 3 Utah 
2d. 107 , 279 P.2d 700, 702 (1955). An acceptance 
of t h e l a n d l o r d w i l l be i m p l i e d where he takes 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e premises and uses them for his 
own purpose. 
I d . a t 1 7 4 . See a l s o 52 C . J . S . L a n d l o r d & T e n a n t , 
Section 493(b)(2) . 
The inconsistent uses of the demised premises by 
Fashion Place are uncontroverted by the record. The fact 
that these inconsistent uses took place establishes a 
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r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t the landlord has accepted the 
surrender of the leased premises. 
. . . I t has been h e l d t h a t an agreement may be 
i n f e r r e d from o b j e c t i v e a c t s of the lessor and 
l e s s e e , and t h a t a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n of 
a c c e p t a n c e a r i s e s on proof of t h e l a n d l o r d ' s 
r e e n t r y and r e s u m p t i o n of the benef ic ia l use of 
the leased premises, or r e l e t t i n g thereof . 
51C C . J . S . L a n d l o r d & T e n a n t , S e c t i o n 126(b), page 408. 
No t e s t i m o n y or e v i d e n c e in t h e r e c o r d was presented to 
s u f f i c i e n t l y r e b u t t h i s p re sumpt ion . Fashion Place must 
t h e r e f o r e be he ld to have accepted Glad Rags' surrender of 
t h e p r e m i s e s and no damages a r e ava i lab le in t h i s act ion 
b e c a u s e s u r r e n d e r r e l e a s e s t h e t e n a n t ' s obl igaton to pay 
r e n t . John C. C u t l e r Associat ion v. De Jay S tores , 3 Utah 
2d 107 , 279 P. 2d 700 (1955); Wil l i s v. Kronendonk, 58 Utah 
5 9 2 , 200 P . 1 0 2 5 , 1028 ( 1 9 2 1 ) . See a l s o , Roosen v . 
Schaffer, 127 Ariz . 346, 621 P.2d 33 (1980). 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held tha t the s torage of 
f i x t u r e s a l o n e in t h e demised p r e m i s e s c o n s t i t u e s an 
acceptance of the surrendered premises: 
< 
In l i g h t of the use of the leased premises by 
t h e [ p l a i n t i f f s ] t o s t o r e t h e i r f i x t u r e s , we 
c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t court was cor rec t in 
f i n d i n g t h a t the surrender of the leased premises 
- 3 0 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was a c c e p t e d by t h e [ p l a i n t i f f s ] through t h e i r 
continuing use of the property to t h e i r benef i t . 
Sandon v. Hansen , 201 N.W.2d. 404, 410 (N.D. 1972). See 
a l s o , John C. C u t l e r A s s o c i a t e s v. De Jay Stores , 3 Utah 
2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955). 
The lease to Life Uniforms for a term which extends 
past the original lease term of Glad Rags indicates that 
Fashion Place intended to accept the surrender of the 
premises by Glad Rags. In 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant, 
Section 498(b)(2), it states: 
. . . i t has been held tha t a r e l e t t i n g for a 
p e r i o d beyond t h e o r i g i n a l t e rm operates as an 
a c c e p t a n c e of a s u r r e n d e r r e l e a s i n g the tenant 
from l i a b i l i t y for any def ic iency, although i t has 
been s t a t ed tha t such r e l e t t i n g i s not conclusive, 
b u t m e r e l y some e v i d e n c e of s u r r e n d e r and 
acceptance. 
In W i l l i s v . Kronendock , 58 Utah 592 , 200 P.1025, 
1030 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
. . . .Where a t e n a n t abandons the premises, 
and t h e l a n d l o r d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y goes i n t o 
p o s s e s s i o n t h e r e o f and t r e a t s them as though the 
t e n a n c y had e x p i r e d , i t amounts to a surrender , 
and t h e l a n d l o r d c a n n o t t h e r e a f t e r recover any 
r e n t , nor sue for damages . If he d e s i r e s t o 
r e s e r v e tha t r i g h t , he must recognize the t e n a n t ' s 
r i g h t s in the premises for the unexpired term, and 
sue him for damages upon his breach of covenant to 
pay r e n t . This , however, i s elementary doc t r ine . 
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See also Belanqer v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 272 P.2d 173 
(1954). 
1 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the surrender doct r ine 
in an a c t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e c a s e a t bar , John C. Cutler 
A s s o c i a t i o n v . De J a y S t o r e s , 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 P.2d 700
 { 
( 1 9 5 5 ) . In t h i s case , the l a n d l o r d / P l a i n t i f f , f i l ed act ion 
a g a i n s t the tenant/Defendant for unpaid rent a f te r Defendant 
v a c a t e d the premises. The court found tha t the landlord had
 { 
a l l o w e d the premises to be u t i l i z e d without compensation for 
t h e s t o r a g e of f u r n i t u r e items owned by another bus iness . 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p r e m i s e s were l e a s e d t o a p o l i t i c a l \ 
organizat ion for a brief per iod. The Utah court s t a t e d : 
. . . U n l i k e t h e o t h e r a c t s of t h e l e s s o r 
C u t l e r as h e r e i n a b o v e r e c i t e d , t h i s act ion [ to 
a l l o w t h e s t o r a g e of f u r n i t u r e on the premises < 
w i t h o u t charge] may well have been regarded by the 
t r i a l c o u r t as an e x e r c i s e of dominion over the 
p r e m i s e s t o t h e exclus ion of the tenant ; t ha t i t 
was used to comport with the des i res of the lessor 
f o r h i s own b e n e f i t , and i n c o n s i s t e n t w i th 
r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r i g h t s of the tenant whom he < 
now seeks to hold for the r e n t a l . 
I d . a t 7 0 3 . On t h i s b a s i s , t h e Utah Supreme Cour t 
a f f i r m e d t h e f i n d i n g s of the t r i a l court tha t a surrender 
i 
and a c c e p t a n c e had o c c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of the storage of 
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f u r n i t u r e on t h e p r e m i s e s and t h e l e a s e t o a p o l i t i c a l 
o rganiza t ion . 
The a c t s of F a s h i o n P l a c e in r e l a t i o n to the demised 
p r e m i s e s e s t a b l i s h e s i t s acceptance of the surrender from 
Glad Rags . The acceptance of the surrender terminates any 
o b l i g a t i o n of Glad Rags t o pay ongoing lease payments to 
F a s h i o n P l a c e and the lower c o u r t ' s decis ion awarding such 
payments must be reversed. 
ISSUE 4 . 
FASHION PLACE FAILED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES AND 
I S THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FROM 
DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION. 
A b a s i c e l e m e n t of c o n t r a c t law r e q u i r e s t h e damaged 
p a r t y t o m i t i g a t e i t s d a m a g e s r e s u l t i n g from a b r e a c h of 
c o n t r a c t . A s s u m i n g f o r t h e s a k e of a r g u m e n t , w i t h o u t 
a d m i t t i n g , t h a t G l a d R a g s b r e a c h e d t h e c o n t r a c t , F a s h i o n 
P l a c e h a s t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o make a good f a i t h e f f o r t t o 
m i t i g a t e d a m a g e s . 
T h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a f t e r Glad Rags v a c a t e d t h e 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s , F a s h i o n P l a c e c o n t a c t e d p e r s p e c t i v e 
t e n a n t s a n d q u o t e d t h e m r e n t a l f i g u r e s of $15 t o $20 p e r 
s q u a r e f o o t a n n u a l l y (R. 3 6 2 , 5 0 8 ) . The M a l l m a n a g e r 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was i n s t r u c t e d by F a s h i o n P l a c e t o q u o t e 
- 3 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t h e s e f i g u r e s (R. 363). In addi t ion to v i r t u a l l y doubling 
t h e r e n t , F a s h i o n P l a c e r e q u e s t e d a lump sum payment of 
$20 ,000 from p e r s p e c t i v e t e n a n t s (R. 344, 411). Fashion 
P l a c e a l s o f a i l e d to mi t iga te i t s damages when i t f a i l ed to 
a c c e p t a w r i t t e n o f f e r from t h e Chalk Ga rden , another 
woman's r e t a i l c l o t h i n g s to re which offered to pay rent at 
approx imate ly $8 per square foot i n i t i a l l y and esca la t ing to 
$14 per square foot annually (R. 412). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doct r ine of 
m i t i g a t i o n of damages in l a n d l o r d and tenant s i t u a t i o n s 
where t h e t e n a n t v a c a t e d t h e demised premises. Meyer v. 
E v a n s , 16 Utah 2d 56 , 395 P .2d 727 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Univers i ty 
Club v . I n v e s c t o Ho ld ing C o r p o r a t i o n , 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 
P.2d 29 (1972). 
The l a n d l o r d ' s duty to mi t iga te damages in l i gh t of his 
a t t e m p t t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y increase the rent was discussed 49 
Am. Ju r . 2d Landlord & Tenant, Section 622: 
. w h e r e , upon a contemplated re ren t ing of 
t h e p r e m i s e s , t h e l a n d l o r d i n s i s t e d on an 
ag reemen t which would have been at variance with 
t h e t e rms under which the premises had o r i g i n a l l y 
been r e n t e d , i t has been held tha t such conduct, 
a l o n e or in combination with other circumstances, 
showed a breach of the l and lo rd ' s duty to mi t iga te 
damages. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has similarly stated: 
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The f ind ings of the t r i a l court ind ica te tha t 
t h e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e in the rent could 
not be c o n s i d e r e d a good f a i t h e f fo r t to mi t iga te 
damages . [ P l a i n t i f f ] argues tha t i t i s improper 
t o r e a c h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s imp ly b e c a u s e t h e 
p r o p e r t y was l i s t e d fo r r e n t a t t h e h i g h e r 
f i g u r e . If s e e k i n g a h i g h e r r e n t i n h i b i t s the 
r e r e n t a l of the premises, i t cannot be found to be 
in good f a i t h . There was testimony tha t showed 
t h a t the higher rent f igure was firm and did deter 
t h e r e r e n t a l . I t was thus not c l ea r ly erroneous 
f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o find tha t the f a i l u r e to 
o b t a i n a new tenant was due in par t to an increase 
in r e n t a l . 
S e v e r a l c a s e s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
i n d i c a t e t h a t an increase in sought-af ter r en ta l 
may v i o l a t e t h e l a n d l o r d ' s d u t y t o m i t i g a t e 
d a m a g e s and p r e s e n t s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . 
[ C i t a t i o n s o m m i t e d . ] The t r i a l court properly 
used t h e e v i d e n c e of t h e l i s t i n g agreement as 
showing an i n t e n t i o n on the par t of the landlord 
t o s e e k a h i g h e r r e n t . The c o u r t t h e r e u p o n 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h i s i n t e n t i o n ended t h e 
l a n d l o r d ' s previous good fa i th e f fo r t s to minimize 
damages. . . . 
The d u t y t o min imize damages i s met by a 
"good f a i t h e f f o r t t o m i t i g a t e d a m a g e s " . In 
a b s e n c e of a n y a s s e r t i o n or showing t o t h e 
c o n t r a r y , t h e good fa i th of the [ p l a i n t i f f ] w i l l 
be presumed. The burden of showing a lack of good 
f a i t h e f f o r t on t h e p a r t of [ p l a i n t i f f ] i s 
necessar i ly upon [defendant] . 
Mar-Son, I n c . v . Terwaho E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c . , 259 N.W.2d 
289, 292-293 (N.D. 1977). 
The r e c o r d c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e n t a l pr ice 
q u o t e d t o p e r s p e c t i v e l e s s e e s was at subs t an t i a l variance 
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w i t h t h e t e rms of the o r ig ina l lease by increas ing the rent 
from $8 .50 per square foot annually to approximately $15 to 
$20 per s q u a r e f o o t . Th i s c o n d u c t a l o n e e s t a b l i s h e s a 
b r e a c h of Fashion P l ace ' s duty to u t i l i z e good f a i t h e f fo r t s 
t o m i t i g a t e t h e damages. Fashion P l ace ' s des i re to obtain 
h igh r e n t s i n h i b i t e d perspect ive tenants from leas ing the 
p r o p e r t y and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p rope r ty ' s vacancy for a 
p e r i o d in excess of 15 months. In add i t ion , Fashion P l ace ' s 
r e q u e s t fo r a $20 ,000 payment from perspect ive tenants i s 
c l e a r l y not a good f a i t h e f f o r t t o mi t iga t e and must be 
presumed to have inh ib i ted the r en ta l of said proper ty . 
F a s h i o n P l a c e a l s o f a i l e d to mi t iga te i t s damages by 
f a i l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e w r i t t e n lease offer from the Chalk 
Garden , a n o t h e r women's c lothing s t o r e . The Chalk Garden 
i n i t i a l l y offered to pay $8 per square foot for the demised 
p r e m i s e s . T h i s f i g u r e would have e s c a l a t e d to $14 per 
s q u a r e f o o t (R. 4 1 2 ) . Such a l e a s e , although i n i t i a l l y 
f a l l i n g 50 c e n t s per square foot short of Glad Rags' lease 
r a t e , would have been a f inanc ia l advantage to Fashion Place 
by i n c r e a s i n g t h e r e t u r n on the demised premises over the 
t e rm of t h e Glad Rags l e a s e , and would have mit igated the 
damages of t h e p a r t i e s . Fashion P l ace ' s f a i l u r e to accept 
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s a i d offer from the Chalk Garden c o n s t i t u t e s a breach of the 
l and l o rd ' s duty to mi t iga te damages. 
. . .When [ t e n a n t s ] abandon t h e i r lease and 
t u r n e d t h e p r e m i s e s over to Samuel Shoe Co., [a 
new l e s s e e ] t h a t company was a b l e , ready, and 
w i l l i n g to assume a l l the obl iga t ions of [ t enan ts ] 
under t h e l e a s e and t o c o n t i n u e t o occupy the 
p r e m i s e s . Had [ landlord] accepted t h i s company as 
a t e n a n t t h e y would not have been damaged in the 
l e a s t . What t h e mo t ive of [ l a n d l o r d ] was tha t 
p rompted them t o r e j e c t the Samuel Shoe Co. as a 
t e n a n t i s no t m a t e r i a l . Attent ion i s ca l led to 
t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e in Wilson v. R e f i n i n g 
Co., [126 Kan. 139, 266 P. 941, 943] supra: 
"Where a p a r t y s e e k s r e d r e s s for 
t h e wrong of a n o t h e r , the law requi res 
t h a t he do wha t eve r he reasonably can, 
and improve a l l reasonable oppor tun i t ies 
t o avo id t h e consequences and to lessen 
the in ju ry . " 
The r e c o r d h e r e i s c l e a r t h a t r e a s o n a b l e 
a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of [ l a n d l o r d ] would have 
prompted them to have accepted the Samuel Shoe Co. 
as a t enan t . 
Marmont v . Axe, 135 Kan. 368 , 10 P .2d 826 , 827 (1932). 
F a s h i o n P l a c e b r e a c h e d i t s d u t y t o m i t i g a t e damages by 
f a i l i n g t o accept the Chalk Garden of fer . The Chalk Garden 
would have met the tenant mix required by Fashion Place (R. 
333) and t h e r e n t r e c o v e r a b l e from the Chalk Garden would 
have s u b s t a n t i a l l y exceeded the rent payable by Glad Rags. 
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T h e s e t w o b r e a c h e s of F a s h i o n P l a c e ' s d u t y t o m i t i g a t e 
t h e d a m a g e s r e n d e r s F a s h i o n P l a c e i n e l i g i b l e t o r e c o v e r 
damages f o r u n p a i d r e n t from Glad R a g s . 
ISSUE 5 . 
THE T R I A L C O U R T ' S AWARD OF HALF DAMAGES I S 
U N S U B S T A N T I A T E D BY THE RECORD AND MUST BE 
. OVERTURNED ON APPEAL. 
T h e o n l y e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d c o n c e r n i n g t h e damages 
s u f f e r e d by F a s h i o n P l a c e i s t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e Mal l 
M a n a g e r , R o b e r t G a r w o o d . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t b e c a u s e t h e 
p r e m i s e s w e r e v a c a n t f o r 15 m o n t h s , a t t h e normal r e n t a l 
r a t e d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d , t h e o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e due t o 
F a s h i o n P l a c e f r o m G l a d R a g s on t h e o n g o i n g l e a s e was 
$ 2 4 , 4 6 7 . 8 7 ( R . 3 2 2 ) . I n t h e F i n d i n g s a n d C o n c l u s i o n s 
d r a f t e d by F a s h i o n P l a c e ' s a t t o r n e y , i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e 
C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e l e a s e a r r e a r a g e s a m o u n t e d t o 
$ 2 4 , 4 6 7 . 8 7 . T h e F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s make no r e f e r e n c e 
t o a n y o t h e r d a m a g e s o r a m i t i g a t i o n of d a m a g e s (R . 
2 7 9 - 2 8 4 ) . T h e j u d g m e n t of $ 1 2 , 2 3 3 . 0 0 , i s e x a c t l y h a l f of 
t h e a m o u n t p r a y e d by F a s h i o n P l a c e (R. 2 7 7 - 2 7 8 ) . T h e r e i s 
no t e s t i m o n y or e v i d e n c e t h a t h a l f of t h e amount p r a y e d f o r 
by F a s h i o n P l a c e h a s any r e l a t i o n t o c o m p e n s i b l e damage . 
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Where t h e F i n d i n g s of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
not s u b s t a n t i a t e d by competent evidence in the record, the 
Supreme Cour t i s o b l i g a t e d t o o v e r t u r n them. In Ranch 
Homes, I n c . v . G r e a t e r Park City Corp. , 592 P.2d 620, 626 
(Utah 1979), the court stated: 
G e n e r a l l y , i t i s the perogative of the t r i a l 
c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s and we affirm when 
t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e r e o f i s s u p p o r t e d by 
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. However, when a finding i s 
so p l a i n l y u n r e a s o n a b l e t h a t no t r i e r of fact 
cou ld f a i r l y make such a f i n d i n g , i t cannot be 
s a i d t o be s u p p o r t e d by subs t an t i a l evidence and 
t h e f i n d i n g w i l l be re jec ted as a matter of law, 
and the fact determined otherwise. 
As a f u r t h e r s t a t e m e n t of t h e standard of review on 
a p p e a l , t h e U t a h Supreme Cour t s t a t e d in S u p e r t i r e 
M a r k e t i n g , I n c . v . R o l l i n s , 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P. 2d 132, 
135 (1966): 
, .we n o t e o u r a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t in s p i t e of t h e often declared 
b road perogative possessed by the t r i e r of fact in j u d g i n g the c r e d i b i l t y of witnesses in determining 
t h e f a c t s , i t i s not e n t i r e l y without l i m i t . One 
of t h e most s a l u t a r y f e a t u r e s of our system of 
government i s tha t throughout i t s e n t i r e s t ruc tu re 
t h e r e are checks and balances against the exerc ise 
of d e s p o t i c power or u n r e a s o n i n g act ion by any 
o f f i c i a l or f u n c t i o n a r y . I t i s the duty of the 
c o u r t s t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s e p ro t ec t i ons ; and they 
t h e m s e l v e s s h o u l d not be exempted from t h i s 
p r i n c i p a l . T h i s i s t h e b a s i s for the r igh t of 
r e v i e w on a p p e a l whereby a court or jury may be 
p r e v e n t e d from o b d u r a t e l y r e f u s i n g t o a c c e p t 
c r e d i b l e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e w i t h o u t any 
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r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d o i n g s o . The D e f e n d a n t ' s 
c h a l l e n g e p o s e s t h e q u e s t i o n whether t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t was g u i l t y of s u c h a t r a n s g r e s s i o n h e r e . 
[Emphasis added . ] 
S e e a l s o , B o y e r Co. v . L i g n e l l , 567 P . 2 d 1112 ( U t a h 
1 9 7 7 ) ; F i r s t W e s t e r n F i d e l i t y v . Gibbons & Reed Co . , 27 
Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) . 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s b a s i c s t a n d a r d of review on appea l 
r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t be j u s t i f i e d by 
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e in t he r e c o r d , t he Utah Supreme Court 
has s t a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y concern ing damages: 
T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t on 
d a m a g e s w i l l not be r e v e r s e d if i t i s suppor ted by 
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d . We w i l l , 
h o w e v e r , r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t i f t h e r e i s a 
m i s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l aw t o t h e e s t a b l i s h e d 
f a c t s . H a r d y v . H e n d r i c k s o n , 27 U t a h 2d 251 , 
495 P.2d 28 (1972) . 
B i t z e s v. Sunset Oaks, I n c . , 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982) . 
There is no substantial evidence in the record which 
gives the trial court a basis for dividing the requested 
damages in half and awarding that amount to Fashion Place. 
Without substantial evidence in the record, the judgment for 
damages must be reversed. 
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ISSUE 6 . 
FASHION PLACE ACTED AS A BAILEE FOR THE ITEMS LEFT 
BY GLAD RAGS IN THE DEMISED PREMISES AND BREACHED 
I T S BAILMENT AGREEMENT BY LOSING CONTROL AND 
POSSESSION OF SAID ITEMS. 
S h o r t l y a f t e r G l a d Rags v a c a t e d t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s , 
t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o an a g r e e m e n t whereby Glad Rags was 
a u t h o r i z e d t o l e a v e c e r t a i n a r t i c l e s of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y on 
t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s s u b j e c t t o 48 h o u r s 1 n o t i c e by F a s h i o n 
P l a c e t o r e m o v e s a i d i t e m s (R. 3 8 8 , 3 9 4 ) . T h i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
a b a i l m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s and F a s h i o n 
P l a c e b r e a c h e d t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p by f a i l i n g t o a d e q u a t e l y 
a n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y d e a l w i t h t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e 
a l l e g e d d e l i v e r y of n o t i c e t o r emove . 
T h e e l e m e n t s of a b a i l m e n t a r e t h e i n t e n t t o c r e a t e a 
b a i l m e n t , d e l i v e r y of p o s s e s s i o n of t h e b a i l e d i t e m s , and 
a c c e p t a n c e of t h o s e i t e m s by t h e b a i l e e . T h e g e n e r a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a b a i l m e n t a r e c l e a r l y l a i d o u t in C u g n i n i 
v . R e n t a l s C a t t l e C o . , 648 P . 2 d 1 5 9 , 164 ( C o l o . App. 1 9 8 1 ) : 
. . . B a i l m e n t i s t h e d e l i v e r y of p e r s o n a l 
p r o p e r t y by o n e p e r s o n t o a n o t h e r i n t r u s t f o r a 
s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e w i t h a c o n t r a c t , e x p r e s s e d or 
i m p l i e d , t h a t t h e t r u s t s h a l l b e f a i t h f u l l y 
e x e c u t e d a n d t h e p r o p e r t y d u l y a c c o u n t e d f o r when 
t h e s p e c i a l p u r p o s e i s a c c o m p l i s h e d . Simons v . 
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First National Bank, 30 Colo. App. 260, 491 P. 2d 
602 (1971). 
The record establishes that a bailment was actually created 
between the parties when Fashion Place agreed to allow Glad 
Rags1 personal property to remain on the premises. 
The bailee has an obligation to exercise due care when 
holding property entrusted to him. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
. . . t h e Defendan t as b a i l e e has a duty to 
e x e r c i s e reasonable care and caution commensurate 
w i t h a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r 
s a f e k e e p i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of others ent rus ted to 
him; and t h a t if i t i s destroyed during bailment, 
a presumption a r i s e s tha t i t i s through his f a u l t ; 
and the burden i s upon him to prove lack of f a u l t . 
Barlow U p h o l s t e r y and F u r n i t u r e v . Emmelf 533 P.2d 900, 
901 (Utah 1975). 
A f a c t u a l d i s p u t e a r i s e s concerning the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and r e t u r n of s a i d p e r s o n a l p roper ty by Fashion Place as 
b a i l e e . F a s h i o n P l a c e c la ims i t del ivered not ice to Glad 
Rags t o remove t h e property (R. 451). Glad Rags claims i t 
r e c e i v e d no such n o t i c e (R. 5 4 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e 
r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s f a c t has no c o n s e q u e n c e t o Fashion 
P lace ' s duty as b a i l e e : 
On t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e b a i l m e n t , t h e 
b a i l o r has t h e r i g h t to resume possession of the 
p r o p e r t y , o r , i f t h e b a i l e e c o n t i n u e s in 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e proper ty , the ba i lo r may t r e a t 
t h e c o n t r a c t as cont inuing. If the ba i l ee wishes 
t o end h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under t h e b a i l m e n t 
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t e r m i n a b l e a t w i l l , he s h o u l d r e s t o r e t h e 
personal ty to the b a i l o r ; . . . . 
8 C.J .S . Bailments, Section 41(c) . 
F a s h i o n P l a c e had the obl iga t ion to e i t h e r r e s to re the 
i t e m s t o Glad Rags or c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e b a i l m e n t was 
c o n t i n u i n g . At a minimum, Fashion Place should have safely 
s t o r e d t h e b a i l e d property on behalf of the Glad Rags with 
n o t i c e of t h e l o c a t i o n , c o s t s , and c h a r g e s which would 
a c c r u e . There i s no evidence in the record to ind ica te tha t 
F a s h i o n Place took any s teps to care for Glad Rags' property 
e i t h e r b e f o r e or a f t e r t h e a l l e g e d t e r m i n a t i o n of the 
b a i l m e n t a g r e e m e n t . The Findings of Fact s t a t e tha t ". . 
. D e f e n d a n t [Glad Rags] . . . never requested t h e i r re turn 
p r i o r t o t h e r e - l e t t i n g of t h e p r e m i s e s . " (R. 281) The 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law s t a t e the same language (R. 283). This 
i s , however , t h e wrong s t a n d a r d , b e c a u s e the ba i lee i s 
o b l i g a t e d t o r e s t o r e t h e b a i l e d i t e m s t o the ba i lo r or 
consider the bailment as ongoing. 
Because a b a i l m e n t was es t ab l i shed and Fashion Place 
d i d not f u l f i l l i t s ob l iga t ions under the bailment for the 
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s a f e k e e p i n g and r e t u r n of t h e p r o p e r t y , Glad Rags i s 
e n t i t l e d t o recover damages based on the appraised value of 
t h e b a i l e d i t e m s . See W i n t e r s v . C h a r l e s Anthony , 
I n c . , 586 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1978). 
The F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s s t a t e t h a t t h e signs 
( i t e m s 1 and 2 on E x h i b i t 8) had no value , and tha t the 
l i g h t f i x t u r e s ( i t ems 12, 13, 14 and 15 on Exhibit 8) were 
p r o p e r t y of F a s h i o n P l a c e under t h e Lease Agreemen t . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e o t h e r p e r s o n a l property (items 3-11 on 
E x h i b i t 8) was n o t m e n t i o n e d i n t h e F i n d i n g s and 
C o n c l u s i o n s . There i s evidence in the record concerning the 
v a l u e of t h e s e f i x t u r e s . The Findings and Conclusions make 
no mention of the bailment or the d i spos i t i on of these items 
in l i g h t of Fashion P l ace ' s duty to care for the i tems. The 
t r i a l c o u r t misapplied the law to the es tab l i shed fac ts and 
s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be r e v e r s e d . Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). 
ISSUE 7 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT AND THE JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE. 
I n G l a d R a g s 1 C o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t F a s h i o n P l a c e , Glad 
R a g s p r a y s f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e s e c u r i t y d e p o s i t h e l d by 
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F i r s t F e d e r a l S a v i n g s & Loan Association in the amount of 
$ 2 , 2 6 7 . 0 0 (R. 5 9 - 6 3 ) . The t r i a l court made no findings or 
c o n c l u s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e p o s i t . The deposi t was an 
i s s u e ra ised at the t r i a l , e spec ia l ly in l i gh t of Glad Rags1 
a l l e g a t i o n s tha t Fashion Place agreed to re turn the deposi t 
a f t e r Glad Rags had departed from the demised premises. (R. 
3 8 9 ) . Because t h e s e c u r i t y d e p o s i t was s e t for th as a 
s e p a r a t e c a u s e of a c t i o n in Glad Rags1 Counterclaim, the 
t r i a l c o u r t was obl igated to at l e a s t address t h i s mater ia l 
i s s u e and e i t h e r award t h e d e p o s i t t o Fashion Place, in 
r e d u c t i o n of t h e damages awarded , or award the secur i ty 
deposit to Glad Rags in i t s e n t i r e t y . 
A r t i c l e 3 4 of t h e Lease Agreement, at tached hereto as 
Appendix I I , s t a t e s in pe r t inen t p a r t : 
B. I f any of t h e r e n t s herein reserved or 
any o t h e r sum payable by tenant to landlord sha l l 
be overdue or unpaid. . . then landlord may, at i t s 
o p t i o n and w i t h o u t prejudice to any other remedy 
which t h e l a n d l o r d may have on account thereof, 
a p p r o p r i a t e and a p p l y s a i d e n t i r e deposi t or so 
much t h e r e o f as may be n e c e s s a r y to compensate 
l a n d l o r d t o w a r d t h e payment of t h e r e n t or 
a d d i t i o n a l r e n t or l o s s or damage sustained by 
landlord to such breach on the par t of t enan t . . . 
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F a s h i o n P l a c e L e a s e , A r t i c l e 3 4 , p . 28 (Ex. 1 ) . Because 
F a s h i o n P lace su f f e r ed no damages, the e n t i r e d e p o s i t should 
be r e t u r n e d to Glad Rags. 
The U t a h Supreme Court has s t a t e d t h a t i t i s neces sa ry 
f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s 
o f . l a w on a l l m a t e r i a l i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d in the c a s e . In 
R o m r e l l v . Z i o n s F i r s t N a t i o n a l B a n k , 611 P.2d 392, 394 
(Utah 1980) , t he Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e the t r i a l c o u r t had the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the a d v i s o r y 
v e r d i c t of a j u r y . Rule 5 2 ( a ) , U . R . C . P . , s t a t e s 
in p a r t : 
I n a l l a c t i o n s t r i e d [on] t he f a c t s 
w i t h o u t a j u ry or wi th an adv i so ry j u r y , 
t h e c o u r t s h a l l f ind t he f a c t s s p e c i a l l y 
and s t a t e s e p a r a t e l y as c o n c l u s i o n s of 
l a w t h e r e o n , and j u d g m e n t s h a l l be 
e n t e r e d pur suan t t o Rule 58A. . . . 
T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i s mandatory and may not be 
w a i v e d . I n r e M u r p h y ' s E s t a t e , 269 Minn. 393, 
131 N.W.2d 220 (1964) ; 9 Wright & M i l l e r , Fede ra l 
P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e : C i v i l Sec t ion 2335, 2574 
( 1 9 7 1 ) . F a i l u r e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make 
f i n d i n g s on a l l m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f a c t i s 
r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . R u c k e r v . D a l t o n , Utah, 598 
P . 2d 1 3 3 6 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . S e e a l s o , S o r e n s o n v . 
Bee r s , 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980) . 
The t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o make F ind ings of Fac t and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law p e r t a i n i n g t o a l l m a t e r i a l i s s u e s 
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p r e s e n t e d . G a l d Rags 1 C o u n t e r c l a i m p r a y s f o r t h e r e t u r n of 
t h e s e c u r i t y d e p o s i t , w h i c h i s s u e i s n o t a d d r e s s e d by t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t . B e c a u s e t h e F i n d i n g s a n d C o n c l u s i o n s have 
f a i l e d t o a d d r e s s t h i s m a t e r i a l i s s u e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
r u l i n g must be r e s e r v e d . 
POINT 8 
GLAD RAGS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
F a s h i o n P l a c e f i l e d i t s a c t i o n a g a i n s t Glad Rags on 
N o v e m b e r 3 , 1 9 8 2 . T h e f i l i n g o f t h e C o m p l a i n t (R . 2) 
o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e r e l e t t i n g of t h e demised p r e m i s e s t o 
F l e e t F o o t a n d L i f e U n i f o r m s . The C o m p l a i n t s e e k s damages 
u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t f o r u n p a i d r e n t d u r i n g t h e 
v a c a n c y p e r i o d . I t i s c l e a r from t h e C ompla in t t h a t F a s h i o n 
P l a c e i s p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e t o r e c o v e r 
t h e u n p a i d r e n t b a l a n c e i t b e l i e v e s i t i s e n t i t l e d t o . 
The L e a s e Agreement e x e c u t e d J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 7 4 , s t a t e s : 
A r t i c l e 2 5 . 
ATTORNEYS1 FEES. 
In t h e event t h a t in any time dur ing the term 
of t h i s l e a s e e i t h e r t h e l a n d l o r d or the t e n a n t 
s h a l l i n s t i t u t e any a c t i o n or p roceeding a g a i n s t 
t h e o t h e r r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s 
l e a s e , or any d e f a u l t he reunder , t h e n , and in t h a t 
e v e n t , t h e u n s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y in such a c t i o n or 
p r o c e e d i n g a g r e e s t o r e i m b u r s e t h e s u c c e s s f u l 
p a r t y f o r t h e r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and 
d i s b u r s e m e n t s i n c u r r e d t h e r e i n by the s u c c e s s f u l 
p a r t y . 
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Fashion Place Lease, Ar t i c l e 25 (Ex. 1 ) . 
I f t h i s c o u r t reverses the decis ion of the t r i a l court 
b e c a u s e t h e abandonment s t a t u t e , Utah Code Ann. 78-36-12.3, 
i s not a p p l i c a b l e , a n d / o r b e c a u s e F a s h i o n Place i s not 
e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r damages under the terms of the common 
law or l e a s e , t h i s court should a lso award a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
to Glad Rags under the above provis ion . 
CONCLUSION 
F a s h i o n P l a c e i s not e n t i t l e d to recover damages from 
Glad Rags under any theory. The Utah s t a t u t e on abandonment, 
Utah Code Ann. 7 8 - 3 6 - 1 2 . 3 , i s not appl icable because Glad 
Rags does not meet t h e f a c t u a l r e q u i r e m e n t s under tha t 
s e c t i o n and t h e s t a t u t e i s intended for a purpose d i s t i n c t 
from t h i s case . Fashion P l ace ' s use is the demised premises 
fo r i t s own b e n e f i t and to the exclusion of Glad Rags, by 
u s i n g t h e p r e m i s e s fo r Merchant Association meetings and 
s t o r a g e of o t h e r t e n a n t s ' p r o p e r t y , c o n s t i t u t e s an 
a c c e p t a n c e of t h e surrender of the Glad Rags' premises and 
t e r m i n a t e s the l e a s e . Fashion Place fa i l ed to mi t iga te i t s 
damages by request ing a r e n t a l of almost double the reserved 
r e n t in t h e Glad Rags l e a s e , and request ing $20,000 from 
p e r s p e c t i v e t e n a n t s before they could occupy the premises. 
F a s h i o n P l a c e i s not e n t i t l e d to recover under the lease 
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t e r m s or t h e common law and may not be placed in a be t t e r 
p o s i t i o n than if Glad Rags had not departed from the Fashion 
P l a c e M a l l . The c o u r t ' s award of one half of the damages 
p r a y e d for by Fashion Place i s unsubstant ia ted by the record 
and c a n n o t be u p h e l d . Fashion Place acted as a ba i l ee for 
t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of Glad Rags l e f t in the demised 
p r e m i s e s and b r e a c h e d t h a t b a i l m e n t agreement by losing 
p o s s e s s i o n and contro l of the bai led property and by f a i l i n g 
t o t a k e adequate s teps to de l iver the property to Glad Rags. 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s ru l ing must be reversed because the t r i a l 
c o u r t fa i led to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on a l l mater ia l i ssues of fact when no decis ion or ru l ing on 
t h e s e c u r i t y deposit was made. Glad Rags requests tha t t h i s 
c o u r t r e v e r s e t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and award 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees under the terms of the lease agreement. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s /pCf^aay of May>. 1985. 
(m^iim— 
i 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed four t r u e and a c c u r a t e 
c o p i e s of t h e foregoing Br ief of Appe l lan t t o Raymond Sco t t 
B e r r y , G r e e n , H i g g i n s & B e r r y , 900 Newhouse B l d g . , 10 
E x c h a n g e P l a c e , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111, t h i s frLJ day 
of May, 1985. 
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APPENDIX I 
LEASE PROVISIONS CONCERNING DEFAULTS BY TENANT 
Article 22. 
DEFAULT BY TENANT. 
Should t h e Tenant at any time be in defaul t 
h e r e u n d e r w i th r e s p e c t to any r e n t a l payments or 
o t h e r c h a r g e s payable by the Tenant hereunder . . 
. or s h o u l d t h e t e n a n t v a c a t e or abandon the 
p r e m i s e s , t h e n t h e L a n d l o r d may t r e a t t h e 
o c c u r r e n c e of any one or more of the foregoing 
e v e n t s as a breach of t h i s Lease, and in addi t ion 
t o any or a l l o t h e r r i g h t s or r emed ie s of the 
L a n d l o r d h e r e u n d e r and by t h e law provided, i t 
s h a l l b e , a t t h e option of the Landlord, without 
f u r t h e r n o t i c e or demand of any kind to Tenant or 
any other person: 
(a) The r igh t of the Landlord to declare the 
t e rm ended and t o r e -en te r the premises and take 
p o s s e s s i o n t h e r e o f and remove a l l p e r s o n s 
t h e r e f r o m , and t h e Tenan t sha l l have no fur ther 
claim thereon or thereunder; or 
( b ) The r i g h t of t h e L a n d l o r d w i t h o u t 
d e c l a r i n g t h i s Lease ended t o r e - e n t e r t h e 
p r e m i s e s and occupy or lease the whole or any par t 
t h e r e o f fo r and on account of the Tenant and upon 
such terms and condi t ions and for such rent as the 
L a n d l o r d may deem proper and to c o l l e c t said rent 
and any o t h e r r e n t t h a t may t h e r e a f t e r become 
p a y b l e and apply the same toward the amount due or 
t h e r e a f t e r t o become due from the Tenant and on 
a c c o u n t of such e x p e n s e s of such sub le t t ing and 
any o t h e r damages sustained by the Landlord; and 
s h o u l d such r e n t a l be l e s s than tha t herein agreed 
t o be paid by the Tenant, the Tenant agrees to pay 
such d e f i c i e n c y to the Landlord in advance on the 
payment of minimum annual r e n t a l and to pay to the 
L a n d l o r d f o r t h w i t h upon any such r e l e t t i n g the 
c o s t s and e x p e n s e s t h e L a n d l o r d may i n c u r by 
reason thereof; or 
( c ) The r igh t of the Landlord even though i t 
may have r e l e t t h e premises, to the rea f t e r e l ec t 
t o t e r m i n a t e t h i s Lease and a l l of the r i gh t s of 
the Tenant in or to the premises. 
Should t h e L a n d l o r d have r e l e t the premises 
under the provis ions of subparagraph (b) above, i t 
may e x e c u t e any such lease e i t h e r in i t s own name 
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or in t h e name of the Tenant as i t sha l l see f i t 
bu t t h e t e n a n t t h e r e i n named s h a l l be under no 
o b l i g a t i o n whatsoever to see to the app l ica t ion by 
L a n d l o r d of any r e n t c o l l e c t e d by the Landlord 
from such t e n a n t , nor sha l l the Tenant hereunder 
have any r i g h t or a u t h o r i t y whatever to c o l l e c t 
any r e n t from such t enan t . The Landlord sha l l not 
be deemed t o have t e r m i n a t e d t h i s Lease, or the 
l i a b i l i t y of the Tenant to pay rent t he rea f t e r to 
a c c r u e , or i t s l i a b i l i t y for damages under any of 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s hereof, by any such re -en t ry or by 
any a c t i o n in unlawful de t a ine r , or o therwise , to 
o b t a i n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s , un less the 
L a n d l o r d s h a l l have no t i f i ed the tenant in wr i t ing 
t h a t i t has so e l e c t e d t o terminate t h i s Lease, 
and t h e Tenant fur ther covenants tha t the service 
by t h e L a n d l o r d of any n o t i c e p u r s u a n t to the 
u n l a w f u l d e t a i n e r s t a t u t e s of the Sta te of Utah 
and t h e s u r r e n d e r of possession pursuant to such 
n o t i c e s h a l l not ( u n l e s s the Landlord e l e c t s to 
t h e c o n t r a r y a t t h e t ime of or a t any t ime 
subsequen t to the serving of such not ices and such 
e l e c t i o n be ev idenced by a wr i t ten not ice to the 
T e n a n t ) be deemed t o be a t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s 
L e a s e . N o t h i n g h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d s h a l l be 
c o n s t r u e d as ob l iga t ing the Landlord to r e l e t the 
whole or any p a r t of the premises. In the event 
of any e n t r y or taking possession of the premises 
as a f o r e s a i d , t h e Landlord sha l l have the r i g h t , 
bu t not the ob l iga t ion , to remove therefrom a l l or 
any p a r t of the personal property located there in 
and may p l a c e t h e samein s t o r a g e a t a p u b l i c 
w a r e h o u s e a t t h e e x p e n s e and r i s k of t h e 
owner thereof 
Should t h e L a n d l o r d e l e c t to terminate t h i s 
Lease under the provis ions of subparagraphs (a) or 
(c) a b o v e , t h e Landlord sha l l thereupon, without 
w a i t i n g f o r t h e end of t h e t e rm h e r e o f , be 
e n t i t l e d to recover from the Tenant as damages the 
d i f f e r e n c e , i f any , between the then reasonable 
r e n t a l value of the premises for the period of the 
t e rm r e s e r v e d in t h e Lease and t h e amount of 
r e n t a l and other charges payable by the Tenant for 
t h e b a l a n c e of t h e t e rm of t h i s Lease, together 
with the rent then unpaid if any. 
• . . 
The r e m e d i e s g i v e n t o t h e Landlord in t h i s 
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a l l o t h e r r i g h t s or remedies which the Landlord 
may have under the laws then in force . 
The w a i v e r by Landlord of any breach of any 
t e r m , covenant or condit ion herein contained sha l l 
no t be deemed to be a waiver of such term covenant 
or c o n d i t i o n or any subsequent breach of the same 
or any o t h e r t e r m , covenant or condit ion herein 
c o n t a i n e d . The s u b s e q u e n t a c c e p t a n c e of rent 
h e r e u n d e r by Landlord sha l l not be deemed to be a 
wa ive r of any preceeding breach by tenant of any 
t e rm c o v e n a n t or c o n d i t i o n of t h i s Lease, other 
t h a n t h e f a i l u r e of Tenant to pay the p a r t i c u l a r 
r e n t a l so a c c e p t e d , r e g a r d l e s s of L a n d l o r d ' s 
knowledge of such preceeding breach at the time of 
a c c e p t a n c e of such r e n t . No covenant , term or 
c o n d i t i o n of t h i s Lease sha l l be deemed to have 
been waived by Landlord unless such waiver be in 
wr i t ing by Landlord. 
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APPENDIX I I 
SECURITY DEPOSIT 
A r t i c l e 3 4 . 
A. T e n a n t h a s d e p o s i t e d w i th L a n d l o r d t h e sum 
s p e c i f i e d in Ar t i c l e 1 hereof as "Securi ty Deposit" r ece ip t 
of which i s hereby acknowledged. Said deposi t sha l l be held 
by L a n d l o r d w i t h o u t l i a b i l i t y for i n t e r e s t as secu i r ty for 
t h e f a i t h f u l performance by Tenant of a l l the terms of t h i s 
Lease by s a i d Tenan t t o be o b s e r v e d and performed. The 
s e c u r i t y d e p o s i t s h a l l not be m o r t g a g e d , a s s i g n e d , 
t r a n s f e r r e d or encumbered by Tenant without the wr i t ten 
c o n s e n t of L a n d l o r d and any such act on the par t of Tenant 
s h a l l be w i t h o u t force and effect and sha l l not be binding 
upon Landlord. 
B. I f any of t h e r e n t s herein reserved or any other 
sum payable by Tenant to Landlord sha l l be overdue andunpaid 
or should Landlord make payments on behalf of the Tenant, or 
Tenan t sha l l f a i l to perform any of the terms of t h i s Lease, 
t h e n L a n d l o r d may, a t i t s option and without prejudice to 
any o the r remedy which Landlord may have on account thereof, 
a p p r o p r i a t e and apply said e n t i r e deposi t or so much thereof 
as may be n e c e s s a r y t o compensa t e L a n d l o r d toward teh 
p a y m e n t of r e n t or a d d i t i o n a l r e n t or l o s s or damage 
s u s t a i n e d by L a n d l o r d due t o such breach on the par t of 
T e n a n t ; and Tenant sha l l forthwith upon demand re s to re said 
s e c u r i t y t o t h e o r i g i n a l sum d e p o s i t e d . Should Tenant 
comply wi th a l l of s a i d terms and promptly pay a l l of the 
r e n t a l s as t h e y f a l l due and a l l o t h e r sums payable by 
Tenan t t o L a n d l o r d , said deposi t sha l l be returned in fu l l 
to Tenant at the end of the term. 
C. In the event of bankruptcy or other deb to r -c red i to r 
p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t Tenant, such secur i ty deposi t sha l l be 
deemed t o be applied f i r s t to the payment of rent and other 
c h a r g e s due Landlord for a l l periods pr io r to the f i l i n g of 
such proceedings. 
D. L a n d l o r d may de l ive r the funds deposited hereunder 
by Tenan t t o t h e p u r c h a s e of L a n d l o r ' s i n t e r e s t in the 
p r e m i s e s in t h e e v e n t t h a t such i n t e r e s t be s o l d and 
t h e r e u p o n L a n d l o r d s h a l l be d i s c h a r g e d from any further 
l i a b i l i t y w i th r e s p e c t to such depos i t , and t h i s provision 
sha l l also apply to any subsequent t r a n s f e r e e s . 
E. Anything to the contrary nowithstanding containedin 
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Hundred S i x t y Seven Dollars in an account with a federa l ly 
i n s u r e d s a v i n g s and loan assoc ia t ion in l ieu of deposi t ing 
s a i d amount w i th t h e L a n d l o r d , provided, however, Tenant 
s h a l l e x e c u t e in f a v o r of Landlord as assignment form, in i 
t h e form s e t f o r t h on t h e a t t a c h e d Exhibit "G", wherein 
Tenan t a s s i g n s and s e t s over to Landlord a l l r i g h t , t i t l e 
and i n t e r e s t in and to said account. Tenant sha l l deposi t 
s a i d amount , execute the assignment form and cause i t to be 
a c c e p t e d in w r i t i n g by the savings and loan assoc ia t ion at 
t h e t ime of e x e c u t i o n of the Lease by Landlord. Landlord < 
s h a l l ho ld teh savings account passbook and assignment as a 
s e c u r i t y deposit under the terms and condit ions set for th in 
A r t i c l e 34 . Al l i n t e r e s t or ea rn ings accruing from said 
a c c o u n t s h a l l be paid d i r e c t l y to the Tenant by the savings 
and loan association. 
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